

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

THE UNIVERSITY,  
OF MICHIGAN

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SECOND MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Monday 25 February 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman

Mr. A. F. HASSAN

(United Arab Republic)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.A. de MELO FRANCO  
Mr. R.L. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO  
Mr. FRANK da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV  
Mr. G. GUELEV  
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV  
Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON  
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. S.F. RAE  
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY  
Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA  
Mr. V. PECHOTA  
Mr. V. VAJNAR  
Mr. A. MIKULIN

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU  
Ato M. HAMID  
Ato M. CHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL  
Mr. A.S. MEHTA  
Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI  
Mr. C. COSTA REGHINI  
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO  
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI  
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. R. HOSZOWSKI  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU  
Mr. E. GLASER  
Mr. N. ECOBESCU  
Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von PLATEN  
Mr. S. LOFGREN  
Mr. Ulf ERICSSON  
Mr. E. CORNELL

Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN  
Mr. I.G. USACHEV  
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN  
Mr. S. AHMED  
Mr. M. KASSEM  
Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.G. TAHOUDIN

Mr. R.C. BEEHAM

Mr. D.N. BRINSON

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. D.E. MARK

Mr. V. BAKER

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. M.A. VELLODI

The CHAIRMAN (United Arab Republic): I declare open the one hundred and second plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): At the present juncture of our debates the Romanian delegation would like to emphasize an essential aspect of the situation which has arisen during the two weeks since the resumption of the proceedings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. In my view, in those two weeks, while the delegation of the Soviet Union has striven, by submitting three initiatives, to create favourable conditions for speedy progress in various important domains of international relations in general and for the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee in particular, there has been no evidence of any intention by the Western Powers to examine those initiatives with all due attention, to contribute to the progress of the negotiations, or to clear the way towards general and complete disarmament.

Speaking of the initiatives taken by the Soviet Union, I have in mind the statement made by Chairman Nikita Khrushchev that two or three on-site inspections, if they proved necessary, were acceptable in principle (ENDC/73, p.5); the proposal to adopt a declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75); and also the proposal to conclude a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty (ENDC/77).

Today I should like to dwell upon the need to conclude without further delay the treaty providing for the cessation and banning of all nuclear weapon tests, in all environments, for all time. The Romanian people -- like all the peoples the world over -- urgently demands that an end be put to such tests, which are of such a nature as to speed up the arms race in general and the nuclear arms race in particular, and which are bound to act as an element of increasing tension in international relations, as a cause of growing suspicion in the relations between States and between peoples, as a dangerous menace to the health of our generation and to the very existence of the generations to come, as an ever more oppressive burden upon national budgets, and as a factor enhancing the danger of an ever larger number of States having nuclear weapons at their disposal. Our debates have highlighted the fact that now, at the beginning of the present year, the best political and technical conditions have been created for reaching agreement.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

Once again, Mr. Chairman, I should like to draw the attention of my fellow delegates to the responsibility we hold towards all peoples, hundreds of millions of ordinary people, who demand that in solving this issue we should be constantly inspired by a deep concern to ensure peace and the future of mankind. What is holding us back from reaching agreement? At first sight it would appear that we have become stuck on an issue of figures, on the number of on-site inspections. It would appear that, precisely as the ghost haunted Hamlet, so the "numbers game" is haunting us. But is that the question? In fact the stumbling-block in the way of agreement, an agreement whose conclusion is admitted by everybody to be closer than ever, is of quite another nature. It is a question not of arithmetic but of politics. The real stumbling-block is the very stand taken up by the Western nuclear Powers which has also prevented us from reaching agreement in the past. It is a stand whereby, instead of heeding the imperative need for negotiation and consequently taking into account the interests of the partner in the negotiations, they are seeking to obtain concessions from that partner without actually meeting him half way.

The Romanian delegation is persuaded that the main goal aimed at by the conclusion of the agreement we are now negotiating is the cessation once and for all of nuclear weapon tests of all kinds and in all environments. Within the framework of that agreement the parties signatory to it can take all the necessary steps to guarantee their security. Can those steps be taken without the national interests of any of the signatory States being prejudiced or endangered? It is the considered view of the Romanian delegation that at the present stage of international relations, at the existing level of the development of science and technology, it is entirely possible to reach a settlement which would meet that requirement.

The agreement may contain a settlement providing for the setting-up of a verification system which, on the one hand, should guarantee that no State could carry out nuclear weapon tests without being detected and, on the other hand, should not jeopardize the national security of either of the parties.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

The debates in our Committee, the talks outside it and experience itself have made it clear that national means of detection are sufficient to cover the practical requirements of control over the implementation of the commitments deriving from the test ban treaty.

In the course of our negotiations the representatives of the Soviet delegation have stated repeatedly that the national control system can detect and identify any relevant scientific event; and nobody has been able to demonstrate the contrary scientifically for the simple reason that it cannot be demonstrated. One might retort that neither has the assertion of the Soviet delegation been demonstrated. The answer is simple indeed: facts are the best demonstration. All nuclear weapon explosions, whether announced previously or not, have been detected and identified by all the States which have perfected good modern recording systems. We can hardly believe that the United States is not in possession of such a system.

The United States delegation presents things so as to make it appear as if its opposition to such solutions were not determined by political reasons but were based on scientific and technical data. It has told us time and again that the technologists and scientists who act as advisers to the United States Government deny that the detection of any violation of the commitments deriving from the treaty can be ensured by national means alone. I do not know who those technical advisors are, nor do I venture to consider whether they have been rightly selected or not. However, I should like to submit that not all scientists in the United States agree with that opinion. For instance, this is the point of view expressed by the Head of the Harvard Seismological Station, Professor Leet:

"If the Department of Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, or any other agency of our Government, wants for good and sufficient reasons to insist on frequent inspections of Russia, that's fine, and I'm all for it if it is urgently needed. But I dissent vigorously from their trying to make it appear that they are helpless victims of the intransigencies of nature, and basing their policy on the 'experimentally proven' difficulty of detecting by seismological means past violations involving underground shots. They have proven nothing of the kind".

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

As a matter of fact, as appears from statements made by renowned United States scientists, it frequently happens that the opinions of the scientists whose advice is asked for by the United States Government, instead of having a bearing on political decisions, have to be adjusted to political positions which have been established a priori without their having been consulted. Thus, in an interview published by the Center for Study of Democratic Institutions of Santa Barbara, California, Professor Hans Bethe stated in March 1962:

"One major problem which one faces as a scientist lies in the difference in approach to the problem-solving process between scientists and non-scientists. For instance, when one testifies before a Congressional committee, one often has the impression that the purpose of the hearing is not to search out the facts and then reason a solution, but that the solution has been determined, and the hearing will now put such facts on the record as will support the solution. One might say they are not gathering facts but arguments for their position."

I will not presume upon the valuable time of this Committee by quoting the abundant testimony given by reputed scientists in the United States whose views obviously contradict the stand of the United States delegation. I shall content myself by saying that, in spite of the growingly self-evident fact that seismic events can be detected and identified by national means, the United States delegation has not up till now given proof of flexibility in negotiation and has continued to ask for on-site inspections.

Out of a sheer desire to reach an agreement, the Soviet delegation accepted the setting-up of an international scientific commission, as part of the verification machinery under the system known to all the members of this Committee. Then we were told by the representatives of the Western nuclear Powers and their allies that that was not sufficient either, and again they insisted that a number of on-site inspections be granted.

The Soviet Government did not stop at that point. Giving further proof of its flexibility in negotiations, it has agreed to the placing of three automatic control stations -- the so-called "black boxes" -- on its territory, with permission for representatives of an international centre to set them in place and visit them in order to collect the recorded material. The representatives of the Western nuclear



(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

Powers and their allies stated that that new element of control was not sufficient either, and they again obsessedly asked for on-site inspections. "Accept the principle of international on-site inspection", they said, "and everything will be all right; the agreement will be instantly concluded."

The negotiations seemed to have entered a blind alley. At that point the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union took political action I stress "political" -- of tremendous importance for our negotiations, for a détente in the international situation, for world peace. Though the Soviet Government still held the view that the national verification systems would suffice to check the implementation of the commitments undertaken under the test ban treaty, nevertheless, in order to remove the last barrier, it accepted a number of two or three on-site inspections if they were necessary. But even now the representatives of the Western nuclear Powers and of their allies are not satisfied. To their mind the number is not sufficient. They ask for seven inspections.

But is it that the political significance of the concession made by the Soviet Government has not been understood? Has it not been understood that the Soviet Union, by offering the Western nuclear Powers this supplementary insurance, this super-insurance, has been guided by the desire to come to an agreement?

During last Friday's meeting the representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle, referring to the statement of the Soviet delegation that the number of inspections is not a bargaining matter, concluded his brief intervention with the rhetorical question, "Is this negotiation?" (ENDC/PV.101, p.45) May I be allowed to follow his example and ask him the same question: Is the manner in which the United States delegation answers all the Soviet proposals negotiation? Much has been said here about flexibility in negotiations. The Western delegations constantly claim that the United States delegation has proved flexible in negotiations; and they give as an example the fact that the United States Government, although it had originally asked for a larger number of inspections, has subsequently "in the course of negotiations" reduced the number to twenty, twelve, ten, eight, seven inspections.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

We do not dispute that example. It is a statement of fact. But there is flexibility and flexibility. There are concessions and concessions. We must acknowledge that there is a striking difference between the concessions made by the Soviet Union and those made by the United States. The Government of the Soviet Union, though convinced that on-site inspections are not necessary, has agreed to switch over from a system of verification without inspection to a system of verification implying inspection too. In this case we have an essential concession, a concession of substance, exclusively political and --- I stress --- of tremendous political significance. On the other hand, the United States Government, in spite of the facts and opinions which make it obvious that national systems are amply sufficient for verification purposes, continually adheres to the position of demanding on-site inspections. So it has made no essential concession, no concession of substance.

I hope that everybody in this conference room understands what is meant by flexibility --- where the real concessions in the negotiations come from. I hope also that everybody will understand that the settlement of the issue with which we are concerned must be sought on a political and not on a technical basis. At the present stage the conclusion of the agreement depends, not upon laboratory research work or upon new concessions by the socialist side, but upon the political decision of the Government of the United States.

The Romanian delegation has not lost confidence in the triumph of reason. We trust that the United States delegation, assisted by all of us, will make genuine concessions in negotiations and give proof of real flexibility by deeds and not by mere words. The Romanian delegation holds that if the problems of the cessation of nuclear tests are examined here, in the plenary meetings of this Conference, and not passed over to the test ban Sub-Committee; if those problems are tackled in a realistic manner, with the conviction of the necessity to conclude an agreement at an early date; then this Committee will be in a position to proclaim to mankind that an end has been put to a nightmare. Later it will pass to other difficult, complicated and complex issues.

Upon entering this hall we did not leave all our hopes at the door. The words that Dante inscribed on the gate of the Inferno cannot and must not be written on the frontispiece of this hall.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): I do not know whether it is the custom in this Committee, as it is in many other bodies, for a maiden speaker to claim the indulgence of his colleagues when he first addresses them. If it is, I gladly claim that indulgence for what I have to say this morning. I shall, on this occasion at any rate, avoid handling any controversial material which may be lying around and of which I thought I detected perhaps just a trace in the remarks of the speaker who preceded me. I want this morning only to develop very briefly one quite simple argument, and at the end to make a very simple plea.

In listening to the discussions during the past two weeks one very clear impression has been left on my mind, and that is the special attention which has been concentrated on the question of a nuclear test ban agreement. I think I am right in saying that all the representatives of the non-aligned Powers who have spoken have said that it is towards that end that we must first and foremost direct our efforts; so have the representatives of Canada and Italy; and so have the representative of the United States and the leader of my own delegation. I thought that the representative of Romania made the same point again this morning. And last, but very far from least, I noted that the leader of the Soviet delegation indicated at our last meeting -- and I am sure that I am not misinterpreting him -- that he was now prepared to go along with this view. So far, then, so good.

The question, therefore, that the Conference now has to consider is how best to set about that task. One suggestion that has been made in our recent discussions is that we should now revive for this purpose the test ban Sub-Committee, which should keep the full Conference regularly and fully informed of its deliberations. I have noted, for instance, that our Italian colleague Mr. Cavalletti has on more than one occasion pressed strongly for that; and it will also be recalled that the leader of my own delegation has said that that is the procedure which the United Kingdom delegation would prefer and which, indeed, would be most natural. I am bound to say, however, that I am not sure that that is the unanimous view of the Conference. I believe that our Canadian colleague has said that he feels it would be better to discuss the subject, at any rate for the time being, in plenary meetings. I think that the majority of the spokesmen of the non-aligned countries

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

have expressed the same view. The representative of Romania said the same thing this morning, and it was certainly a view which was strongly expressed at our last meeting by Mr. Kuznetsov.

Mr. Godber has already said that on this matter the United Kingdom delegation is prepared to be entirely flexible. We are willing to accept discussion in any forum, provided only that it offers hope of progress; and if the general sense of the Conference is that it wishes to continue to discuss the test ban issue in plenary meetings, then, so far as the United Kingdom delegation is concerned, so be it. But in that event what precisely is it that the Conference should discuss in plenary meetings? For the moment, it seems to me, there are some divergences of view on that point. The leader of the Soviet delegation, at our last meeting -- and indeed I think previously as well -- indicated (ENDC/PV.101, p.34) that he was not willing that the Conference should at present consider anything other than what he described as the main issues. From that I take it that he is not willing to discuss anything to do with the conclusion of a test ban treaty until there has been some agreement on the number of on-site inspections and on the number of automatic seismic detection stations to be established.

I should be the last, of course, to deny the vital importance of reaching agreement on those points; but it does seem to me that if the Conference is, so to speak, to sit about waiting for that to be achieved, we shall not be making the most profitable use of our time. Let me give just one reason for holding that view. The representatives of the non-aligned members of the Conference, while they have naturally agreed on the importance of reaching agreement in what has come to be called the "numbers game", have, I think, made three things quite clear: first, that they do not think this is something in which they can take a direct part -- in other words, that the question of reaching agreement on numbers is something which principally concerns the nuclear Powers themselves; secondly, that they believe all the same that there are many other very important features of a test ban agreement on which they have serious and substantial contributions to offer; and, thirdly, that in order that those matters may be discussed pari passu with the question of numbers they are anxious to retain the general question for discussion in the plenary meetings.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

I must say that I myself find it hard to resist the validity of arguments such as those. We have all of us heard some most valuable suggestions from the spokesmen of the non-aligned countries, and not only from them, about many of the various matters which have to be considered in drawing up a treaty. I feel sure that each of them has many other such contributions to make, and it is natural that they should be eager to make them. Are such contributions to be put, so to speak, into the deep freeze until the question of numbers has been settled?

It may be said that, once the question of numbers has been settled, all else will be settled with relative ease; and I hope indeed that this may be so. But I feel that the representative of Sweden was right when she referred to the time-consuming nature of the study of many such questions, and when she urged that the Conference should be thinking about them now (ENDC/PV.100, p.25). If I may respectfully echo Mrs. Myrdal's words, I should myself say that it would be a time-wasting policy -- and we are all of us conscious of the importance of time in this matter -- if we were to decide that we can make not only no progress but no real start in considering any of these other important issues (I need not specify them now) just because for the moment we are, unhappily, not yet in agreement on how to bridge what we all recognize to be the major gap between the two sides. I urge most respectfully that we should agree, all of us, to study from now on seriously and in depth the various suggestions which may be put forward not only on numbers but on all aspects of a nuclear test-ban agreement.

The leader of the Soviet delegation has, I think, expressed a fear and a dislike of becoming bogged down in what he calls details. I must frankly and respectfully answer that at some stage a great number of most important matters must be considered, not all of which by any means are details in the accepted sense of the term, before we shall be able to agree upon a treaty. In dealing with these matters we ought to be able to rely confidently upon and to make the fullest possible use of all the wealth of experience and statesmanship which is to be found around this table. I hope that we shall all agree to start on this task -- or, if you prefer, to continue it -- seriously, in depth and in the round, and to do so without any avoidable delay.

Mr. NASEKOWSKI (Poland)(translation from French): During the general debate the Polish delegation has expressed its views on the problem of the prohibition of nuclear tests. I now intend to deal with some specific aspects of this problem. It is quite natural that the prohibition of nuclear tests should attract public attention. There is a general fear of the disastrous effects which the incessant development of this weapon could have on the world.

The problem of the prohibition of nuclear tests is composed of various interdependent elements. I cannot be agreed that one nuclear Power should give up nuclear tests while the other continues such tests. Moreover, one side could scarcely be expected to give up all forms of tests while the other continued, for instance, its underground tests. We can only draw the obvious conclusion that an agreement to prohibit nuclear tests must cover all forms of tests. The negotiations which have taken place so far show clearly that there is one unresolved problem which blocks the way to the prohibition of nuclear tests: the problem of underground explosions of small magnitude.

During the general debate we have noted a concordance of views between the socialist States and the Western Powers on the elements comprising the control system which would be set up to ensure compliance with the nuclear test ban. The system would comprise the following elements:

Networks of national control posts.

Automatic seismic stations.

On-site inspections.

An international co-ordination centre.

There is therefore agreement in principle on the basic elements of a future control system. That is a positive fact which can serve as the basis for future negotiations and for reaching an agreement.

It should, however, be noted, first, that this reconciliation of views is primarily due to the constructive attitude of the Soviet Union, and secondly, that the two sides still hold divergent views on the relative importance and right proportions of the various elements making up such a system.

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

The main and undeniable conclusion which we can draw from several years of negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear tests and from the development and advances of seismology, is that all nuclear explosions can be detected by the means of control at present available, that is to say, by networks of national control posts. It is this network of national posts which constitutes the basic and adequate control element. The Western Powers, unfortunately, have not so far been prepared to accept this fact. Not long ago the representative of Sweden furnished us with data on a dense network of meteorological and geophysical posts which could be utilized for verifying the prohibition of tests. At our meeting on 20 February Mrs. Myrdal again emphasized the possibilities offered by scientific institutes and observation posts belonging to countries other than the nuclear Powers, and the part which those institutes and posts could play in ensuring compliance with an agreement (ENDC/PV.100, pp. 25 et seq).

We share the view expressed by the Swedish delegation that the great family of scientists could make a valuable contribution by utilizing the achievements of modern technology to guarantee that an agreement to prohibit nuclear tests should not be broken.

Automatic seismic stations would constitute the second element of a future control system. The proposal put forward at Pugwash by the scientists of both sides that black boxes should be used for controlling a future nuclear test ban is of immense value, and we are glad that the United States and the United Kingdom, after some hesitation, have also accepted it. At the same time, the attitude adopted by the United States during the informal negotiations in New York and Washington, which is reflected in its proposal that the number of such stations in the territory of the Soviet Union should be increased from three to seven, cannot but cause serious misgivings. Anyone who is at all familiar with scientific data in this field realizes that these demands have no foundation. Let us take as an example some factual information provided by three Soviet seismologists in an article published on 11 November 1962 in the newspaper Izvestia (ENDC/67). The

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

authors of this article state that a certain number of seismographs at present in use with an amplification of 500,000 enable a nuclear explosion of 2 kilotons to be detected at a distance of 10,000 km. Certain other scientific communications lead to the conclusion that scientists already have at their disposal equipment which is twice as powerful. Even if we confine ourselves to the data furnished by the Soviet scientists in this article, and if we suppose that these seismographs were installed in automatic stations located in the regions proposed by the Soviet Union, the range of these instruments would be sufficient to cover not only the seismic regions of the Soviet Union but also a considerable proportion of its remaining territory, as well as territories belonging to other countries. There would furthermore be some overlapping in the coverage of these automatic stations.

From the exchange of letters between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy, it would appear that both sides foresee the possibility of installing automatic stations outside the territory of the Soviet Union, namely at Hokkaido, in Pakistan and in Afghanistan, all in the vicinity of the seismic zones of the Soviet Union. Altogether, therefore, there would be not three but six automatic stations covering the seismic zones of the Soviet Union. What, then, would be the object of installing as many as seven such automatic stations in the territory of the Soviet Union?

There is also another argument. The representatives of the Western Powers still persist in their old contention that a large number of events occur in the territory of the Soviet Union which can be suspected of being nuclear explosions. However, this problem should be dealt with in a practical way. The United States delegation speaks about a certain number of so-called "doubtful" phenomena, without considering that once an agreement has been signed, the United States scientists will have at their disposal not only their own data on subterranean shocks but also the data furnished by the Soviet seismic stations and by the automatic stations. These latter would exercise continuous control.



(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

The only conclusion that can be drawn from a scientific and objective appraisal of these two control elements, national posts and automatic stations, is that they are fully capable of ensuring that any future agreement will not be violated. In spite of this conclusion, the Soviet Union has agreed that the principle of on-site inspection should also be incorporated in the control system. In view of the importance of those first two elements of the control system, it is understandable that inspection cannot be treated as of equal importance and still less as a primary element of control. In the control system we are trying to develop, the role of inspection is qualitatively different from that of the means of detection and identification of subterranean shocks, that is from national seismic stations and automatic seismic equipment. Inspection has no significance except as an auxiliary form of control.

Representatives of the non-socialist States have agreed that that this is also their view of the role of inspection. I should like to quote in this connexion the statement of the representative of India, Mr. Lall, in the First Committee of the General Assembly on 10 October 1962 (A/C.1/PV.1246, p.21). Basing himself on the views of United States, United Kingdom, Soviet and Indian scientists taking part in the Pugwash Conference, Mr. Lall expressed the opinion that an agreement to prohibit nuclear tests could be concluded on the basis of the Joint Memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries (ENDC/28) with the addition of on-site international inspection as a supplementary measure. This view bears out the specific character of inspection.

The present attitude of the Soviet Union, which has agreed to two or three inspections annually on its territory, is in keeping with this principle. In adopting this attitude, the Soviet Union has met the wishes of the Western partners. While proposing a balanced and practical system for controlling the prohibition of nuclear tests including inspection, the Soviet Union is understandably not prepared to agree to the immoderate demands of the United States.

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

The Western Powers must, in their turn, give proof of their willingness to compromise. Such action by the Western Powers would make it possible to begin working out the details of an agreement and would clear the way for its early conclusion. That would be in the interests of security and of the future of mankind. Those responsible for any failure to grasp the outstanding opportunity which now exists for reaching agreement would incur the grave responsibility of allowing the constant and disastrous improvement of weapons of mass destruction to continue.

It would be an over-simplification to argue that negotiations on the prohibition of tests, as well as the whole discussion on disarmament should take place in the abstract without regard to international events. In actual fact there seems to be no other sphere which is as sensitive to the influence of external political factors as disarmament negotiations.

For this reason, we cannot remain indifferent to the measures which the Western Powers are taking to continue to improve nuclear weapons. The resumption of underground nuclear tests by the United States on the very eve of the resumption of our Conference represents such a measure. At our meeting on 22 February Mr. Stelle, the United States representative, tried to justify this action by asserting that it was the continuation of a series of tests in retaliation for Soviet tests (ENDC/PV.101, p.42). But this argument cannot hold water. We all remember that in the spring of 1962, when the United States was preparing to conduct a series of tests, President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan tried in their statements to justify this action on the ground that the Soviet Union had rejected the principle of international on-site inspection. As we all know, the Soviet Union has now accepted inspection, but the United States is still proceeding with its tests. Where, then, is the logic of this argument?

Nor can we remain passive in the face of plans to establish a so-called NATO multilateral nuclear force. Contrary to what the United States and the United Kingdom representatives have said here in the polemics they have directed against us, these plans represent but another way of disseminating nuclear weapons, and merely increase the already sufficiently great dangers which threaten international peace.

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

During our discussion we have heard two arguments advanced by the United States and the United Kingdom representatives in support of the idea of the multilateral force. The first argument is that the establishment of a NATO nuclear force would prevent the creation of national nuclear forces (ENDC/PV.99,p.18). The second argument is that a multilateral force would serve United States policy by giving that country's allies "a voice in nuclear strategy" (ibid.). But this second argument in fact undermines the first. Let us examine these two arguments in the context of existing realities. What do we find?

Apart from the United Kingdom and France, which already have nuclear weapons, the Federal Republic of Germany is the only State in NATO which can aspire at the present time, and does in fact aspire, to possessing its own nuclear force. As we know, neither Italy nor Denmark nor Norway nor any of the other NATO countries have any such aspirations.

The events of recent years provide irrefutable proof of our theory concerning the aspirations of the Federal Republic of Germany. From 1958 to 1963, from the time when the Bundestag enacted the law permitting the nuclear arming of the Federal Republic of Germany until the recent conclusion of a treaty between Federal Germany and France, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has made every effort to obtain access to nuclear weapons. The results of these efforts, among which we must include the long-standing co-operation between France and the Federal Republic of Germany in research on rockets and nuclear weapons, do not lead us to believe in the efficacy of the restrictions referred to here by Mr. Foster which the Paris Treaty of 1954 imposed on Federal Germany. Moreover, the Western Powers themselves, through declarations made by statesmen and by such military figures as General Norstad, and contrary to the spirit of agreements concluded within the victorious anti-Hitler coalition, have acknowledged the claim of the Federal Republic of Germany to possess nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

In this situation, how can we doubt that the establishment of a NATO multilateral force would result in giving the Federal Republic of Germany the right to co-possession of nuclear weapons? Apart from the illusions and wishful thinking of certain Western politicians, and certainly in accordance with the intentions of the most belligerent NATO circles, it is the only possible interpretation of the United States policy of giving its allies a voice in nuclear strategy. The granting of such a voice to a Power which does not recognize the de facto and de jure situation resulting from the fall of Hitler's Reich, to a State which disputes the present frontiers of Europe and advances revanchist claims against other countries, cannot but cause us great anxiety.

Polish public opinion fully realizes that the granting of the aforesaid rights to the Federal Republic of Germany would amount to placing in the hands of German militarists a new and powerful trump card to support their policy of revenge and their attempts to increase tension in Europe. It would therefore be naive to think that the Hitlerite generals of yesterday will be content with the powers which are being granted them today. This is only the starting-point for the new claims they will make tomorrow. As may be seen from the statement made by Mr. von Hassel, Minister of Defence, on 20 February, the authorities of Federal Germany have already launched the idea of subordinating the multilateral force to the European command of NATO, in an attempt to obtain direct influence on the decision concerning the use of this force. The statement made by Mr. Jaeger, Vice-President of the Bundestag, is a further proof of this. At a meeting of the Defence Commission of Western European Union, he asked that Europe and the United States should become equal nuclear partners.

In his speech of 20 February the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, tried to allay our anxiety by saying that the Federal Republic of Germany was a peaceful State, and had no aggressive intentions (ENDC/PV.100, p.43). It may be that some Western politicians have forgotten certain lessons of history which are still vivid. We Poles cannot follow them in this. For these reasons we cannot accept the unconvincing arguments of the Western States. Neither the lessons of history nor the requirements of our national security allow us to do so.

(Mr. Naszkowski, Poland)

We have reverted to this question neither for reasons of propaganda nor with a view to distracting the Committee's attention from its tasks. We are referring to this problem specifically in order to make the Committee aware of the danger of continuing the armaments race and the perfecting of nuclear weapons. At the same time, our warnings represent an appeal for the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests as speedily as possible, and for efforts which will lead to progress in our negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): First, although the representative of Burma has been suitably welcomed, I should like to express my personal pleasure at seeing him here again. Secondly, I was happy to hear the constructive remarks that Sir Paul Mason, the representative of the United Kingdom, made this morning in his initial statement before the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

I also listened with interest to the comments made by Mr. Mac-vescu, the Ambassador of Romania, and Mr. Naszkowski, the vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland; but unfortunately I found very little of new moment in those comments. I believe that most, if not all, of the items which they covered have been dealt with on the record by some of the Western representatives. I hope to deal at future meetings with those items which are new. Having returned to Geneva only yesterday afternoon, which has not given me the opportunity to review carefully the developments since I left last Wednesday, I shall confine these brief remarks which I am about to make to certain of the important elements covered in my absence, as I see them now.

I have read somewhat quickly the proceedings of the one hundred and first plenary meeting, which took place on Friday, 22 February. I noted in particular the remarks concerning the nuclear test ban problem, to which attention has again been given this morning. I was particularly concerned to hear what Mr. Kuznetsov had to say, in order to learn what his approach was to this subject. I did of course also take note of his sudden departure; and I hope this is a temporary departure, since what he said on Friday, I unfortunately must state, did not in my opinion contain much of a contribution to our advancement in this very important

(Mr. Foster, United States)

area. In fact, he spoke in terms that were so rigid, as I read the verbatim record, that I felt compelled to ask myself how we can find any way to overcome the obstacles, both substantive and procedural, which appear in those comments to be piling up against any progress that we could make in this field. In this connexion I do fully associate myself with Mr. Stelle's preliminary comments on 22 February (ENDC/PV.101, p.42). However, I should also like to add a few observations of my own.

Sovereign Powers can only arrive at mutually-acceptable agreements by taking into account the reasonable opinions and positions of each party to the negotiations. I use the word "reasonable" deliberately, since unreasonable positions adopted by any one side will not lead to capitulation by other sides but, rather, to a failure to achieve the desired accord. Again and again last Friday we of the West were told by the Soviet representative that the present Soviet terms for a test ban were not bargaining positions. There could be no flexibility in numbers of inspections or of unmanned seismic stations. The Soviet figures were offered on a "take it or leave it" basis; and indeed, in one scarcely-veiled passage, Mr. Kuznetsov said that unless the West took up the present Soviet offer quickly it might be withdrawn (ENDC/PV.101, p.29).

On the other hand, for the past several weeks the United States has been seeking to engage the Soviet Union in negotiations on a nuclear test ban. We have been pursuing this objective publicly, in the plenary meetings of this Conference, and privately, at first in the United States and more recently here. There is no issue of ours that we have declared to be immutable, save the fundamental principle that a test ban agreement must be adequately verified. We have not asked of our negotiating partner more than we ourselves are willing to give. We have not refused to alter our position until our partner alters his. The records of these meetings testify to the truth of that statement. What we have said for the official record has been reinforced in our private exchanges with Soviet representatives here and elsewhere. There has been no intimation of an ultimatum in anything we have said. We are offering and asking for negotiations on a basis of equality and for recognition of the fact that agreement is possible only if basic national concerns are mutually reconciled. Beyond any shadow of a doubt the Soviet Government knows that, if it wanted them, fair, rapid and decisive negotiations could begin today.

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General statements of good intent do not suffice for the serious business in which we are engaged. Therefore the United States has given proof of its desire to reach agreement. I reported to this Conference two weeks ago (ENDC/PV.96, p.11) that during the private talks in New York and Washington the United States had offered to consider reducing by three the number of automatic seismic stations -- and I repeat, automatic seismic stations -- it proposed should be installed on Soviet territory. We thought the two sides were not far apart on the question, and that agreement might at least be reached on that element of the verification system. One would hope the Soviet Government would be able to find seven suitable places in the Soviet Union where automatic seismic stations could be established without compromising sensitive defence installations. As for transit to and from the stations, Mr. Khrushchev himself suggested a mode of transportation which I presume would satisfy the Soviet Government. So conditions for genuine negotiation on this point certainly exist. Moreover, a concrete United States proposal has been made again to bring the two sides closer together. This Conference, therefore, it would seem to us, has a right to ask: What are we waiting for?

Last week the United States Government decided to give further specific evidence of its desire to advance negotiations on another issue which the Soviet Union regards as a key item in these talks. This Conference and the Soviet Government knew that the United States did not insist upon eight to ten on-site inspections as its immutable, rock-bottom figure. We have felt, however, that the number is somewhat irrelevant unless and until it is placed within the context of a system which would make each inspection effective and reliable. Consequently we have urged our negotiating partner to tell us how, in general, it envisages using on-site inspections (ENDC/PV.99, p.22). After all, to us the Soviet position is completely unknown, except for two numbers which stand stark and alone in the middle of a featureless desert. And even those numbers may be a mirage unless we can see them organically related to some kind of verification system which will give them life and meaning.

We appreciate that the Soviet Government made an important decision of principle when it re-affirmed its old offer of three on-site inspections. We did not want these talks to bog down because one side was waiting for the other to move. Accordingly we too took an important decision of principle: without waiting to hear the Soviet

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position on other aspects of a verification system, we decided to specify a new figure for an on-site inspection quota.

Last week I met privately the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kuznetsov. In that talk I explained the United States position on a number of features of the inspection system it envisaged. I shall describe them to the Conference in the near future. I also told Mr. Kuznetsov that, in the context of the verification framework I had described, the United States could accept as an annual quota for each side seven on-site inspections.

I hope that the Soviet Government is now studying that offer. By that offer I mean not only the new United States quota number, but also the other matters which I put to the Soviet representative. As I have said many times, we believe that in the absence of prospects for immediate agreement on a quota number, the most productive work this Conference could do would be to develop the structure of a verification system. We hope that our new quota proposed has brought agreement closer on this issue; but in any event we think no further time should be wasted on generalities.

We have come, I think, to a very important stage in the short history of the Committee. Ahead of us, if the Soviet Government will permit it, lies agreement on a test ban treaty. Beyond that may lie other disarmament agreements. How short-sighted it would be to lose the opportunity we now have to press forward and to create something which would be more valuable than all the bombs ever built! That opportunity will not be lost, I can assure the members of this Conference, through any fault of the United States.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and second plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. A.F. Hassan, representative of the United Arab Republic. Statements were made by representatives of Romania, the United Kingdom, Poland and the United States.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 27 February 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12 noon.